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The usual justifi cations of democracy attach central importance to fair 
decision-making procedures. However, it is being increasingly empha-
sized that it is necessary to address epistemic considerations to justify 
democracy and democratic authority. In her book Democracy and Truth: 
The Confl ict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Prijić-Samaržija 
defends the view which places emphasis on the necessity of epistemic 
justifi cation of democracy. In this paper, I will discuss her criticism of 
epistemic proceduralism, which can be considered major contemporary 
framework for epistemic justifi cation of democracy. Within the frame-
work of epistemic proceduralism, for justifying democracy and demo-
cratic authority it is necessary to take into account both political and 
epistemic values. Nevertheless, Prijić-Samaržija thinks that epistemic 
proceduralism is not suffi ciently epistemic and that it reduces epistemic 
to political values. I shall argue that epistemic proceduralism can be 
defended from this kind of criticism.
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1. Introduction
The usual justifi cations of democracy attach central importance to fair 
decision-making procedures. However, it is being increasingly empha-
sized that it is necessary to address epistemic considerations to justify 
democracy and democratic authority. In her book Democracy and Truth: 
The Confl ict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Prijić-Samaržija 
defends the view which places emphasis on the necessity of epistemic 
justifi cation of democracy. In this paper, I will discuss her criticism of 
epistemic proceduralism, which can be considered major contemporary 
framework for epistemic justifi cation of democracy. Within the frame-
work of epistemic proceduralism, for justifying democracy and demo-
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cratic authority it is necessary to take into account both political and 
epistemic values. Nevertheless, Prijić-Samaržija thinks that epistemic 
proceduralism is not suffi ciently epistemic and that it reduces epis-
temic to political values. I shall argue that epistemic proceduralism can 
be defended from this kind of criticism.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the second section, the 
distinction between proceduralist and epistemic justifi cation of de-
mocracy is introduced. I also take into consideration certain distinc-
tions within epistemic justifi cation of democracy and present reasons 
underpinning Prijić-Samaržija’s criticism of epistemic proceduralism. 
The third section explores the distinction made by Prijić-Samaržija 
between pure and moderate epistemic proceduralism. In this section 
I discuss her arguments against pure epistemic proceduralism. The 
fourth section of the paper examines her criticism of moderate epis-
temic proceduralism. In this regard, the role of truth in the framework 
of moderate epistemic proceduralism is particularly scrutinized. Sec-
tion fi ve concludes.
2.
I will start my analysis by introducing the distinction between political 
and epistemic values (Prijić-Samaržija interchangeably uses terms po-
litical and epistemic virtues). Basic political values include principles 
of fairness, primarily freedom and equality. It is less clear what should 
be included among basic epistemic values relevant for the political do-
main. In any case, Prijić-Samaržija conceives of epistemic values as a 
broad set of values that include truth, correctness, problem-solving, 
epistemic responsibility (Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 117). In her book De-
mocracy and Truth: The Confl ict between Political and Epistemic Vir-
tues, Prijić-Samaržija examines the signifi cance of political and epis-
temic values for justifi cation of democracy. We usually refer to political 
values of freedom and equality when we want to answer the question 
what makes a political decision-making procedure fair. Obviously, in 
that respect democracy has advantages over non-democratic decision-
making procedures since it treats all participants in a fair way.
In sharp contrast to this, epistemic values in the political domain 
do not necessarily have to favor democracy. Ever since Plato it has 
been claimed that epistemic considerations suggest that the most de-
sirable way of political decision-making is the rule of those who know 
best, which implies the rule of a few. However, this form of rule can be 
rejected because it does not treat all members of society fairly when 
deciding about political issues (Estlund 2008: 35–36). So, it can be con-
cluded that democracy is the most desirable way of decision-making. 
However, that raises an additional question whether democracy itself 
adds to the quality or correctness of political decision-making. Once 
importance of epistemic values in the political domain is recognized, it 
becomes necessary to answer the question whether a democratic way 
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of decision-making matters not only due to procedural fairness, but 
also due to certain epistemic values. If it would prove impossible to 
furnish such an answer, epistemic values could always be evoked when 
someone wants to criticize democracy. The most recent justifi cations of 
democracy therefore consider it necessary to demonstrate that democ-
racy encapsulates both political and epistemic values.
In addition to the distinction between political and epistemic val-
ues, there is a related distinction between proceduralist and epistemic 
justifi cation of democracy. Proponents of proceduralist justifi cation of 
democracy maintain that freedom and equality should be understood 
as purely procedural values. If they are conceived of as procedure-
independent values, then such justifi cations of democracy may favor 
setting limits on democratic decision-making procedures (Dahl 1989: 
169–170). The obvious problem for proceduralist justifi cation of democ-
racy is that it does not provide any criterion for distinguishing between 
good and bad outcomes of democratic decision-making. In this view, 
legitimacy of democratic decision-making is guaranteed by the very 
fairness of the procedure. However, bad decisions can be brought as an 
outcome of fair procedures. Proponents of epistemic justifi cation of de-
mocracy therefore maintain that epistemic criteria must be taken into 
account in order to assess outcomes of democratic decision-making. 
Those espousing epistemic justifi cation of democracy however disagree 
among themselves whether such epistemic criteria should be a part of 
the procedure of democratic decision-making or should be understood 
as standards of correctness that are independent of the procedure. In 
any case, proponents of epistemic justifi cation think that in addition 
to political values, justifi cation of democracy must necessarily include 
some epistemic standards, regardless whether they are understood as 
inherent to the procedure of democratic decision-making or indepen-
dent of it (which of course does not preclude the possibility of making 
both types of standards a part of justifi cation).
Prijić-Samaržija propounds epistemic justifi cation of democracy 
that takes into account both political and epistemic values. She calls 
this a hybrid justifi cation of democracy, because it strives to balance 
both kinds of values. Obviously, aforementioned types of epistemic jus-
tifi cation of democracy, which include types of epistemic procedural-
ism, can also be considered hybrid because they strive to balance po-
litical and epistemic values. However, despite that, Prijić-Samaržija 
maintains that in various types of epistemic proceduralism epistemic 
values are reduced to political values. She says “that they failed to of-
fer a hybrid stance at all because epistemic justifi cation was immedi-
ately either dismissed as secondary or downright sacrifi ced in favor of 
the political and ethical” (Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 145). By contrast, she 
argues that epistemic values should not be reduced to political values 
(Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 14). Instead, one should strive to fi nd a model of 
justifying democracy which to the greatest possible extent will lead to 
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true beliefs and correct decisions. Prijić-Samaržija therefore holds that 
since it insuffi ciently takes into account the epistemic value of truth, 
neither type of epistemic proceduralism is adequate enough for epis-
temic justifi cation of democracy. In the following two sections, I will 
examine more closely her criticism of epistemic proceduralism.
3.
Prijić-Samaržija makes a distinction between two types of epistemic 
proceduralism which she terms pure epistemic proceduralism and 
moderate epistemic proceduralism (Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 122). Even 
though her analysis takes into consideration pure epistemic proce-
duralism fi rst, it should be pointed out that this position, defended by 
Fabienne Peter, had actually emerged as a criticism of the standard 
version of epistemic proceduralism espoused by David Estlund (and 
which Prijić-Samaržija qualifi es as moderate epistemic procedural-
ism). Namely, Estlund has offered arguments in favor of epistemic 
proceduralism as the most adequate theoretical framework for justifi -
cation of democracy and democratic authority. According to Estlund’s 
conception of epistemic proceduralism, this type of normative justifi -
cation has an advantage over alternative proceduralist and epistemic 
ways of justifying democracy. Unlike fair proceduralism, epistemic 
proceduralism takes into account procedure-independent standards of 
correctness. Estlund holds that this is necessary in order to be able 
to make any kind of difference between better and worse outcomes 
(Estlund 1997: 179). There must be some standards of correctness on 
the basis of which outcomes of decision-making procedure can be as-
sessed. However, Estlund claims that epistemic proceduralism offers 
more adequate justifi cation of democracy and its authority than classi-
cal epistemic justifi cations that he calls correctness theories (Estlund 
2008: 102). According to correctness theory, a classical proponent of 
which was Rousseau, not only that a procedure-independent standard 
of correctness should be taken into account, but the decision-making 
procedure must be a fully reliable device for its realization. Rousseau 
therefore considered majority rule one such device so that those who 
fi nd themselves in a minority after voting, have an obligation to act in 
accordance with the voting outcome, since it has been shown that their 
standpoint was wrong.
Estlund argues that correctness theory is too demanding for the 
purpose of justifying democracy and especially for justifying demo-
cratic authority (Estlund 2008: 104). He thinks that the standpoint of 
epistemic proceduralism offers a better alternative, because it can pro-
vide justifi cation of democracy and its authority without recourse to 
requirements that are so demanding. Namely, if the fair procedure has 
a general tendency to lead to correct outcomes, this can be suffi cient for 
justifying democratic authority. Therefore, to justify democracy and its 
authority, it is no longer necessary that the procedure should be a fully 
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reliable device for realizing or advancing procedure-independent stan-
dards of correctness; instead, it should be reliable enough to generally 
have a tendency to lead to their realization. This is what sets epistemic 
proceduralism apart from correctness theories, even though both the-
ories recognize the signifi cance of procedure-independent standards. 
Fabienne Peter criticized Estlund’s version of epistemic proceduralism 
because she thinks that procedure-independent criteria are not neces-
sary for epistemic justifi cation of democracy (Peter 2007: 343). Namely, 
according to the standpoint of pure epistemic proceduralism, epistemic 
quality can ensue from very decision-making procedures that treats 
all participants fairly. Unlike fair proceduralism, the signifi cance of 
epistemic values is recognized, but unlike Estlund’s epistemic proce-
duralism, this conception drops procedure-independent standards of 
correctness. In the rest of this section, I will take into consideration 
arguments which Prijić-Samaržija furnishes against pure epistemic 
proceduralism. In the following section, I will discuss her criticism of 
moderate epistemic proceduralism.
According to the standpoint of pure epistemic proceduralism, fair 
access to the process of democratic decision-making can lead to correct 
outcomes due to inclusiveness and diversity. Although prejudices and 
wrong convictions people hold might fi nd their way into the process 
of democratic decision-making, Peter thinks that they can be fi ltered 
through the process of discussion with other people. Obviously, pure 
epistemic proceduralism would require a procedure of public delibera-
tion as a necessary condition in order to arrive at correct decisions. 
The assumption is that in the process of public deliberation, wrong be-
liefs could be rectifi ed and many prejudices and biases exposed. Peter 
therefore holds that in a fairly organized public deliberation, some ob-
viously incorrect proposals would not be able to hold their ground and 
go through (Peter 2007: 346). The basic idea is that due to inclusiveness 
of a fair procedure, such attitudes would encounter justifi ed criticism. 
Fair procedures, according to the standpoint of pure epistemic proce-
duralism, can lead to realization of the difference between correct and 
incorrect outcomes. Precisely because of that, fair procedures can lead 
to outcomes that are correct.
Two main strands of criticism of pure epistemic proceduralism of-
fered by Prijić-Samaržija are the following. First, she claims that pure 
epistemic proceduralism in effect reduces epistemic values to political 
values. She holds that epistemic values, even though their signifi cance 
is recognized, are derived from political values. Prijić-Samaržija says 
that “pure epistemic proceduralism is not sustainable because it leaves 
the realm of epistemic assessments and reduces the epistemic justifi ca-
tion of democracy to the political” (Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 131). Accord-
ing to Prijić-Samaržija, the role of procedure-independent epistemic 
values is necessary in order to provide epistemic justifi cation of democ-
racy. Given that pure epistemic proceduralism does not recognize any 
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procedure-independent epistemic value, Prijić-Samaržija concludes 
that the main problem with this standpoint is that it is not epistemic 
enough.
Second, she argues that the expectation that fair procedure of public 
deliberation will lead to correct outcome is overly optimistic. She draws 
attention to well-known facts regarding voter ignorance and lack of mo-
tivation to be informed about political issues, insisting that this should 
be taken into account when assessing epistemic contribution of public 
deliberation.1 When in addition to these facts, the evidence about the 
diffi culties in disseminating knowledge of more informed persons with-
in deliberative groups are also taken into account, Prijić-Samaržija ar-
rives to the conclusion that it is more appropriate to hold pessimistic 
expectations regarding the possibility that public deliberation would 
lead towards correct outcomes (Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 132–133). A 
related issue is that pure epistemic proceduralism does not offer any 
threshold for ascertaining whether public deliberation possesses an 
epistemic quality (Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 133). Prijić-Samaržija claims 
that this further corroborates her conclusion that pure epistemic pro-
ceduralism is not epistemic enough.
Regarding the second argument against pure epistemic procedural-
ism, it can be pointed out that fi ndings about voter ignorance mostly 
pertain to existing democratic societies that do not function according 
to the principles of deliberative democracy, but primarily according to 
the majority rule.2 The fact that this particular model of democracy 
does not motivate voters to become more informed, does not necessarily 
mean that they would remain equally uninformed had they had a pos-
sibility to engage in public deliberation to a greater extent. So, it seems 
that broadening the domain for public discussion within existing de-
mocracies could contribute to being more informed and thus to greater 
epistemic quality of the democratic process. The facts about voter ig-
norance thus do not necessarily lead towards a pessimistic conclusion 
about epistemic expectations from deliberative democracy.
If the fi rst criticism that pure epistemic proceduralism reduces epis-
temic to political values is right, then the standpoint of pure epistemic 
proceduralism must be reduced to the standpoint of fair procedural-
ism. It is clear that fair proceduralism, which is based exclusively on 
political values, is not the same as pure epistemic proceduralism that 
is primarily interested in epistemic quality of fair procedures. There-
fore, argument that leads to the conclusion that the standpoint of pure 
epistemic proceduralism is not epistemic enough does not necessarily 
show that in pure epistemic proceduralism epistemic values have been 
reduced to political values. The fact that epistemic values of fair pro-
1 On this point, see also Ahlstrom-Vij 2019.
2 Obviously, public discussion is not excluded, but seems insuffi cient from the 
perspective of deliberative democracy which emphasizes crucial importance of public 
deliberation for democratic legitimacy (Cohen 1997).
 I. Mladenović, Democracy, Truth, and Epistemic Proceduralism 177
cedures are examined underlines that they hold signifi cance for epis-
temic justifi cation of democracy, which indicates that pure epistemic 
proceduralism should be distinguished from fair proceduralism. Pure 
epistemic proceduralism might not be epistemic enough, but in any 
case, unlike fair proceduralism, it recognizes the signifi cance of epis-
temic values for justifi cation of democracy.
4.
Having discussed pure epistemic proceduralism, I now turn to Prijić-
Samaržija’s criticism of moderate epistemic proceduralism. As we have 
already seen, Estlund’s version of epistemic proceduralism is referred 
to in her work as moderate epistemic proceduralism. Prijić-Samaržija 
argues that despite the fact that moderate epistemic proceduralism 
has certain advantages over pure epistemic proceduralism, this stand-
point is still not epistemic enough. That in contrast to pure epistemic 
proceduralism, procedure-independent epistemic values are taken into 
account when justifying democracy, in her view, constitutes an obvious 
advantage of moderate epistemic proceduralism. It is worth reiterating 
that for Estlund’s version of epistemic proceduralism both procedure-
independent standards of correctness and epistemic properties of fair 
democratic decision-making procedures are important for justifi cation 
of democracy and democratic authority.
However, Prijić-Samaržija holds that there is ambiguity concern-
ing whether moderate epistemic proceduralism should be viewed as 
something which is proximate to correctness theories or whether it is 
a kind of a dualism of independent and purely procedural epistemic 
standards (Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 140). Prijić-Samaržija argues that in 
the light of signifi cance attached to procedure-independent epistemic 
values, moderate epistemic proceduralism can be said to resemble cor-
rectness theories. But, given that equal importance is attached to fair 
procedures of democratic decision-making with some inherent epis-
temic characteristics, moderate epistemic proceduralism, according to 
Prijić-Samaržija, is rather akin to a kind of dualism of independent and 
purely procedural epistemic standards. If the fi rst interpretation which 
reduces epistemic proceduralism to correctness theories is rejected 
(given that Estlund explicitly distances his position from correctness 
theories), only the interpretation of epistemic proceduralism as a du-
alistic position remains. The problem, according to Prijić-Samaržija, is 
that such a position is unstable since it cannot be seen how procedure-
independent and procedural values can be balanced, since epistemic 
proceduralism, unlike correctness theories, does not maintain that cor-
rectness of outcomes is a necessary and suffi cient condition for legiti-
macy of democratic decision-making.
Her main argument against moderate epistemic proceduralism 
starts from the assumption that “the result of a good democratic pro-
cedure will be epistemically legitimate even if it is incorrect and a de-
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cision made in a democratic debate will have epistemic value even if 
it is untrue” (Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 140). The basic point is therefore 
the following. If moderate epistemic proceduralism allows legitimacy of 
democratic decision-making even in the case of incorrect decisions, then 
correctness theories that do not allow this, from an epistemic point of 
view, are more adequate for epistemic justifi cation of democracy. Fur-
thermore, according to Prijić-Samaržija, moderate epistemic procedur-
alism proves to be an unstable position because in a case when an in-
correct decision should be obeyed, the source thereof would lie solely in 
a decision-making procedure. Thus, moderate epistemic proceduralism 
is an unstable dualistic position that in justifi cation of democracy ad-
duces either procedure-independent standards of correctness or fair de-
cision-making procedures. Moreover, considering importance attached 
to fair procedures, Prijić-Samaržija concludes that despite the starting 
premises of moderate epistemic proceduralism, epistemic values also 
become reduced to political values (Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 145).
First, it should be noticed that when the possibility of incorrect out-
comes is allowed within epistemic proceduralism, it does not mean that 
such possibility should be seen as a benchmark for the epistemic sig-
nifi cance of procedures. Epistemically relevant benchmark for assess-
ing decision-making procedures within epistemic proceduralism is that 
they generally have a tendency to lead towards correct outcomes. If this 
is the case, such procedures have epistemic value despite the fact that 
in some of their instantiations outcomes might not be correct. There-
fore, the possibility of an incorrect outcome is not a relevant bench-
mark for assessing the standpoint of epistemic proceduralism; rather, 
it is that procedures have a tendency to lead towards correct outcomes. 
Second, as I have already pointed out, unlike correctness theories 
which require fully reliable procedures, epistemic proceduralism re-
quires that procedures should be reliable enough. Unlike pure epis-
temic proceduralism which does not furnish any threshold for epis-
temic values, Estlund points out that this threshold is that outcomes of 
democratic procedures should be better than random. Estlund’s argu-
ment substantiating this proposal is based on his criticism of fair pro-
ceduralism. Namely, it refers to the fl ipping a coin argument (Estlund 
2008: 6). Voting is one fair procedure, but fl ipping a coin is one too. 
If we consider making decisions in a democratic way more signifi cant 
than making decisions by fl ipping a coin, than it means that in order to 
justify procedures of democratic decision-making, they must be better 
than random.
Finally, Estlund thinks that epistemic proceduralism is more ad-
equate than correctness theories for justifying democratic authority 
because in order to create political obligations, it is not necessary that 
a decision-making procedure lead to correct outcome in every single in-
stance. It is suffi cient that a decision-making procedure should have a 
tendency to lead towards correct outcomes. Therefore, for the creation 
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of political obligations, it is not required, as in correctness theories, 
that those who have found themselves in a minority should consider 
their decision wrong. Unlike correctness theories, epistemic procedur-
alism envisages that people would accept obligations that derive from 
a decision-making procedure which has a general tendency to lead 
towards correct outcomes, even when they disagree with a particular 
decision and consider it wrong in the given instance. So, it can be con-
cluded that epistemic proceduralism provides better foundation for jus-
tifying democracy and its authority than correctness theories which on 
epistemic grounds do not allow for a possibility of disagreement and 
any wrong decisions. In that respect, epistemic proceduralism is in-
deed a moderate epistemic position, because it drops overly demanding 
requirements of correctness theories. This can be considered its advan-
tage rather than its disadvantage, at least when epistemic justifi cation 
of democracy and its authority are concerned.
These are the reasons why (moderate) epistemic proceduralism dif-
fers from correctness theories and why it cannot be considered to har-
bour a kind of dualism of epistemic values. Prijić-Samaržija correctly 
notes that it is not easy to see what the role of truth might be in the 
framework of epistemic proceduralism (Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 141). In 
this regard, she says that “Eslund’s dualism of epistemic and politi-
cal values is problematic because he seems to claim that the epistemic 
value of democratic procedure simultaneously is and isn’t related to 
truth” (Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 142). So, it is necessary to determine 
more precisely the role of truth in the framework of Estlund’s epistemic 
proceduralism.
First, one should bear in mind that Estlund proposes a process of 
justifying democracy in two steps.3 In the fi rst step, from the perspec-
tive of reasonable persons or qualifi ed points of view, non-democratic 
forms of decision-making are rejected because they do not pass the test 
of reasonable acceptance. This includes epistocracy or the rule of ex-
perts. Given that only democratic procedure remain in the game, in 
the second step of justifying democracy and democratic authority, the 
question is raised which democratic decision-making procedure is the 
most adequate in epistemic terms, that is, which democratic decision-
making procedure is better than random and reliable enough to real-
ize or advance certain procedure-independent standards of correctness. 
Estlund also thinks that public deliberation to a greater extent than 
other decision-making procedures, can be expected to satisfy these re-
quirements.
Second, it should be noted that procedure-independent standards 
of correctness to which Estlund refers are not necessarily considered 
to have to be true. Namely, some criteria that can be an object of rea-
3 This process is even more complex since it also includes the device of normative 
consent. For the purpose of explaining Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism, it is 
however suffi cient to stick to the fi rst two steps.
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sonable acceptance should not be required to be true, because such a 
requirement would be too demanding. From the perspective of reason-
able persons or qualifi ed points of view, such criteria can be acceptable 
despite the fact that they do not embody the whole truth as it is seen 
from the perspective of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Insisting 
on entire truth as seen from the perspective of reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrines would preclude reaching any kind of agreement. There-
fore, it is more adequate to say that standards of correctness should be 
acceptable to all reasonable persons, rather than they should be true. 
This, however, does not mean that some procedure-independent stan-
dards cannot be considered true, at least in the minimal sense. Estlund 
says that “a statement “x is F” is true in at least minimal sense if and 
only if x is indeed F” (Estlund 2008: 25).
It is reasonable to suppose that what Estlund terms “primary bads” 
such as war, famine, economic collapse, genocide, belong to this class 
of procedure-independent standards (Estlund 2008: 163). Regardless of 
various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that they espouse, reason-
able persons could consider it true that they are bads that should be 
avoided. I point out that all of this pertains to the fi rst step of justifi -
cation of democracy. In the second step, the question is raised which 
democratic decision-making procedure can be reliable enough (i.e. bet-
ter than random) in order to realize procedure-independent standards 
of correctness or avoid primary bads (if they are taken as procedure-in-
dependent standards). The only reason why it could be said that dem-
ocratic decision-making procedure in Estlund’s version of epistemic 
proceduralism is unrelated to truth is that he does not claim that pro-
cedure-independent standards necessarily have to be true. However, 
this does not preclude the possibility that in non-controversial cases, 
reasonable citizens could consider them to be true (as in the case of 
primary bads). In both cases, however, in the second step, a democratic 
decision-making procedure is related to a procedure-independent stan-
dard of correctness, regardless whether it is considered true or accept-
able to reasonable persons.
Third, it seems that Prijić-Samaržija’s criticism presupposes that 
truth for Estlund is a fundamental epistemic value or procedure-inde-
pendent standard. However, as we have seen, epistemic proceduralism 
has a much broader view on procedure-independent standards of cor-
rectness. Whatever criteria might be the case in point, what is relevant 
for justifi cation of democratic decision-making is not to arrive to true 
beliefs, but to outcomes that realize or advance some procedure-inde-
pendent standards of correctness (or avoid them if these standards are 
primary bads). Obviously, some political values will usually be consid-
ered procedure-independent standards of correctness. But this does not 
entail the reduction of epistemic to political values, because these val-
ues are considered in such a way as to yield an epistemic signifi cance 
which is independent of the democratic decision-making procedure.
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Here it would be helpful to draw attention to a distinction between 
theoretical and practical authorities. Theoretical authorities give us 
reasons for belief, while practical authorities give us reasons for action 
(Raz 1986: 29). When justifi cation of democracy and especially demo-
cratic authority is concerned, what is important is not that a democrat-
ic decision-making procedure should lead to outcome which give us a 
reason for belief, but a reason for action. Consequently, for justifi cation 
of democracy and democratic authority, it is not necessary that truth be 
the only relevant epistemic standard. It is more reasonable to assume 
that for justifi cation of democracy, some other procedure-independent 
standards should have their epistemic signifi cance and that demo-
cratic decision-making given its inherently epistemic characteristics 
should provide reasons for action or reasons to comply (Estlund 2008: 
106).4 Precisely because these procedural and procedure-independent 
standards have an epistemic signifi cance, it cannot be said that in the 
framework of epistemic proceduralism, epistemic values are reduced to 
political values.
5. Conclusion
Prijić-Samaržija’s main objection to epistemic proceduralism is that 
this position is too procedural for the purpose of epistemic justifi cation 
of democracy. We have seen that pure epistemic proceduralism does 
not require any epistemic threshold regarding democratic decision-
making procedure. By contrast, moderate epistemic proceduralism sets 
a threshold that the procedure should be better than random. Obvi-
ously, Prijić-Samaržija thinks that this is also not suffi cient and that 
justifi cation of democracy requires fully reliable procedures that will 
lead to truth. But it is doubtful whether such a demanding epistemic 
criteria are necessary for justifi cation of democracy and democratic au-
thority. These criteria seem too demanding if we take into account that 
conception of epistemic proceduralism can be suffi cient for justifying 
democracy and its authority.
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